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' CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES COMMERCE
CLAUSE-PROPRIETARY INTEREST OF STATE IN ITS NATURAL RESOURCES-

Plaintiffs, residents of Georgia, sued to enjoin the enforcement of a South Carolina statute imposing on shrimp boats a license fee one-hundred times greater for
nonresident owners than for resident owners, 1 and requiring all shrimp to be
unloaded, packed, and stamped in South Carolina before shipments into other
states.2 The suit was based on the alleged contravention of the privileges and
immunities and commerce clauses of the Constitution of the United States.8
Plaintiff's petition was dismissed by the trial court.4 On appeal, held, reversed.
The disparity in resident and nonresident license fees constituted discrimination
against nonresidents in violation of interstate privileges and immunities; to require that all shrimp be unloaded, packed, and stamped in South Carolina burdened interstate commerce in a manner forbidden to the states. Toomer 'iJ.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 68 S.Ct. n56 (1948).
The privileges and immunities clause guarantees to nonresidents of a state
equal privileges with residents, and thereby protects nonresidents from the
disabilities of alienage.5 Early cases, though never precisely listing the privileges and immunities of state citizenship, declared them to be fundamental 6

1 S.C. Code (1942) § 3379 as amended by an Act of May 19, 1947 (25 dollars for residents; 2,500 dollars for nonresidents.)
2 S.C. Code (~942) § 3414.
8 U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 2; Art. I, §§ 8 and IO.
~ (D.C. S.C. 1947) 73 F. Supp. 371. See decision note in 46 M1cH. L. REV.
559 (1948).
5 Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 19 S.Ct. 165 (1898); Paul v. Virginia, 8
Wall. (75 U.S.) 168 (1868); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 40
S.Ct. 228 (1920).
6 Corfi.eld v. Coryell, 4 Wash. (C.C. 3d) 371, Fed. Cas. No. 3,230 (1823);
Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 19 S.Ct. 165 (1898); United States v. Miller,
(D.C. Ky. 1936) 17 F. Supp. 65 (ingress and egress); Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S.
37, 40 S.Ct. 221 (1920) (immunity from higher taxation); McKneit v. St. Ixmis &
S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 54 S.Ct. 690 (1934) (access to the courts); Ward v.
Maryland, 12 Wall. (79 U.S.) 418 (1870); Chalker v. Birmingham & N.W. Ry. Co.,
249 U.S. 522, 39 S.Ct. 366 (1919) (doing business within a state).
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as determined from the facts of each case.7 More recently, however, the
court's use of the clause has shifted from classifying certain incidents as privileges and immunities of state citizenship to emphasizing the protection of nonresidents from discrimination by a state in favor of its own citizens.8 On this
basis, the Supreme Court has held that no state is permitted to discriminate
against nonresidents by license legislation. 9 Notable exceptions to this doctrine
exist, however, in cases where the state is legitimately exercising its police power
to control a purely local interest,10 or where the natural.resource protected by
the license is the common property of the state's citizens.11 Although recognizing this latter exception, _the court in the principal case found that it could
not justify the nonresident license fees in question. The decision in McCready
v. Virginia, 12 where the exclusion of nonresidents was upheld for the reason
that fish as a resource are owned by the state in trust for its citizens, was distinguished on the ground that the shrimp affected by the South Carolina statute
in the principal case were freely-swimming .fish located in coastal waters. By
placing commercial shrimping in the category of privileges and· immunities of
state citizenship, the court greatly weakened the doctrine of state ownership of animals ferae naturae.18 Some discrimination is permitted, however, if based on valid
independent reasons other than mere nonresidence,14 and charging nonresidents
higher license fees as their share of upkeep of shrimp beds is such a reason when
the upkeep is initially .financed by resident tax funds. Since the court found
no basis for the use of the police power and discovered no reasonable relation
between the high degree of discrimination and any independent reason South
7

Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 40 S.Ct. 228 (1920).
Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954· (1939); Hess v. Pawloski, 274
U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632 (1927).
.
"
9
Chalker v. Birmingham & N.W. Ry. Co., 249 U.S. 522, 39 S.Ct. 366 (1919);
Ward Baking Co. v. City of Fernandina, Florida, (D.C. Fla. 1928)' 29 F. (2d) 789;
12 AM. JuR., Constitutional Law, § 463. For an annotation, see 61 A.L.R. 337
(1929) and 40 L.R.A. (n.s.) 279 (1912).
10
District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138, 29 S.Ct. 560 (1909); Crowley
v. Christiansen, l3j U.S. 86, II S.Ct. 13 (1890) (liquor); Hudson County Water Co.
v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 28 S.Ct. 529 (1908) (diversion of water); Keeley v.
Evans, 257 U.S. 667, 42 S.Ct. 184 (1922) (professional- licenses).
11
Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. (C.C. 3d) 371, Fed. Cas., No. 3,230 (1823);
McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876); In re Eberle, (C.C. Ill. 1899) 98 F.
295.
12
94 U.S. 391 (1876).
18 The members of the court differed as to the applicability of the privileges and
immunities clause. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson felt that the disparity in license
fees violated the commerce clause, and they deemed the McCready case a controlling
exception to the privileges and immunities clause. See 19 L.R.A. ( n.s.) 297 ( I 909)
and 28 L.R.A. (n.s.) 265 (1910) for a discussion of license discrimination as violative
of the commerce clause. The McCready doctrine was further weakened in the very
recent case of Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410, 68 S.Ct. 1138
(1948), where the Court held that state ownership of fish in coastal waters was insufficient ownership to exclude alien residents from fishing off California.
14
Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 34 S.Ct. 281 (1914).
8
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Carolina might have had for even .slight discrimination, the license fee on nonresident shrimpers was held unconstitutional. The decision that the section
requiring all shrimp to be unloaded, packed and stamped in South Carolina
violated the commerce clause was consistent with the rule that states are prohibited from using conservation regulations to achieve unconstitutional purposes, and that the results of state legislation must be within the residuary powers
of a state,15 and therefore cannot constitute a regulation of interstate commerce.
The principal case is in accord with a prior decision of the court which, although
recognizing state ownership of natural resources, prohibited state regulation
after the individual had reduced the shrimp to possession and placed them in
interstate commerce.16 The case apparently does not go so far as to place shrimp
within the rule of Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,1 1 where the court said that
a state could not interfere with the right of its citizens to export natural resources because such interference would be a violation of the commerce clause.
As a result of the principal decision, however, the .fiction of state ownership of
its wildlife can no longer be used to defeat the fundamental intent of either
the privileges and immunities or commerce clauses.
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Thompson v. Dana, 285 U.S. 529, 52 S.Ct. 409 (1932).
Foster Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 49 S.Ct. I (1928), where
a statute requiring that all shrimp be cleaned in Louisiana before shipment in interstate
commerce was held unconstitutional as it constituted a burden on interstate commerce
by attempting to create a shrimp cleaning monopoly within the state. A similar purpose
is implicit in the South Carolina statute. However, Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519,
16 S.Ct. 600 (1896), is apparently contra, but both the Foster and the principal cases
are distinguishable on the ground that the statute involved in the Geer case did not
contemplate the shipment of game in interstate commerce as did the statutes in the
other two cases. That indicates that the doctrine allowing a state to decide when
game becomes an article of interstate commerce is still valid. Rupert v. United
States, (C.C.A. 8th, 1910) 181 F. 87.
17 262 U.S. 553, 43 S.Ct. 658 (1923).
15

16

